Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains: Complement-Free Cost Functions
  and Beyond by Birmpas, Georgios et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
06
38
4v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
4 O
ct 
20
19
Cost Sharing over Combinatorial Domains:
Complement-Free Cost Functions and Beyond*
Georgios Birmpas1 EvangelosMarkakis2 Guido Schäfer3
1 Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, UK
2 Department of Informatics, Athens University of Economics and Business, Greece
3 Networks and Optimization Group, CentrumWiskunde & Informatica (CWI), the Netherlands
gebirbas@gmail.com markakis@aueb.gr g.schaefer@cwi.nl
October 16, 2019
Abstract
We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing models. Imagine that multiple
items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a
mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining for each item the set of players
who are granted service, together with respective payments. Although there are several works
studying specialized versions of such problems, there has been almost no progress for general
combinatorial cost sharing domains until recently [8]. Still, many questions about the interplay
between strategyproofness, cost recovery and economic efficiency remain unanswered.
The main goal of our work is to further understand this interplay in terms of budget balance
and social cost approximation. Towards this, we provide a refinement of cross-monotonicity
(which we term trace-monotonicity) that is applicable to iterative mechanisms. The trace here
refers to the order in which players become finalized. On top of this, we also provide two param-
eterizations (complementary to a certain extent) of cost functions which capture the behavior of
their average cost-shares.
Based on our trace-monotonicity property, we design a scheme of ascending cost sharing
mechanisms which is applicable to the combinatorial cost sharing setting with symmetric sub-
modular valuations. Using our first cost function parameterization, we identify conditions un-
der which our mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof, O(1)-budget-balanced and O(Hn)-
approximate with respect to the social cost. Further, we show that our mechanism is budget-
balanced and Hn-approximate if both the valuations and the cost functions are symmetric sub-
modular; given existing impossibility results, this is best possible.
Finally, we consider general valuation functions and exploit our second parameterization to
derive a more fine-grained analysis of the Sequential Mechanism introduced by Moulin. This
mechanism is budget balanced by construction, but in general only guarantees a poor social cost
approximation of n. We identify conditions under which the mechanism achieves improved so-
cial cost approximation guarantees. In particular, we derive improvedmechanisms for fundamen-
tal cost sharing problems, including Vertex Cover and Set Cover.
1 Introduction
How to share the cost of a common service (or public good) among a set of interested agents con-
stitutes a fundamental problem in mechanism design that has been studied intensively for at least
two decades. Several deep and significant advancements have been achieved throughout this pe-
riod, notably also combining classical mechanism design objectives (such as incentive compatibility,
economic efficiency, etc.) with theoretical computer science objectives (such as approximability and
computational efficiency).
*A conference version appears in the proceedings of the 27th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2019.
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However, in the vast majority of the cost sharing models that have been proposed and analyzed
in the literature, it is assumed that the mechanism designer is offering a single service and that each
agent has a private value describing the willingness to pay for the service. At the same time, there is
also a publicly known cost function which describes the total cost for offering the service to each pos-
sible subset of agents. Said differently, this results in a single-parameter mechanism design problem,
where the goal is to select a subset of the players that will be granted service, subject to covering the
cost and achieving an economically efficient outcome.
Although significant progress has beenmade for such single-parameter domains, moving towards
more general combinatorial domains has been almost elusive so far. Imagine that there are multiple
goods to be shared among the agents who now have more complex valuation functions, expressing
their willingness to pay for different subsets (or bundles) of goods. The cost function now depends
on the subsets of agents sharing each of the items. An outcome of a mechanism under this setting,
consists of an allocation, which specifies for each agent the goods for which she is granted service,
together with a payment scheme.
The desired properties in designing a cost-sharing mechanism (be it combinatorial or not) are
three-fold: (i) group-strategyproofness: we would like resistance to misreporting preferences by indi-
vidual agents or coalitions, (ii) budget-balance: the payments of the players should cover the incurred
cost, (iii) economic efficiency: the allocation should maximize a measure of social efficiency. The fun-
damental results in [11, 19] rule out the possibility that all three properties can be achieved. As a
result, if we insist on any variant of strategyproofness, we are forced to settle with approximate no-
tions of at least one of the other two criteria. In this context, approximate budget balancemeans that
the mechanism may overcharge the agents, but not by too much. In terms of efficiency, considering
a social cost objective instead of the classical social welfare objective (definitions are given in Section
2) seems more amenable for multiplicative approximation guarantees.
These adapted objectives have been investigated thoroughly for single-parameter problems, espe-
cially for cost-sharing variants of well-known optimization problems. In the context of more general
combinatorial cost-sharing mechanisms, a restricted model with multiple levels of service was first
studied in [16]. Ever since, for almost a decade, there was no additional progress along these lines.
It was only recently that a step forward was made by Dobzinski and Ovadia [8]. In their work, they
introduce a combinatorial cost-sharing model and derive the first mechanisms guaranteeing good
budget balance and social cost approximation guarantees for different classes of valuation and cost
functions. As already pointed out in [8], however, several important questions concerning our un-
derstanding of the approximability of these objectives remain open and deserve further study. This
constitutes the starting point of our investigations reported in this work.
Our Contributions. We make further advancements on the design and analysis of mechanisms for
combinatorial cost-sharing models. To begin with, the analysis of the mechanisms we study asks for
new conceptual ideas (which might be interesting on their own):
• We first provide a refinement of the well-known notion of cross-monotonic cost sharing func-
tions, which is key in the intensively studied class of Moulin-Shenker mechanisms [18] for the
single-parameter domain. We introduce the notion of trace-monotonic cost sharing functions
which is applicable formechanisms that proceed iteratively and evict agents one-by-one. Trace-
monotonicity formalizes the fact that the cost-shares observed by a player for an item do not
decrease throughout the course of the mechanism. That is, these cost shares may depend on
the specific order (or trace as we will call it) in which the mechanism considers the agents.
• We identify two different and (to some extent) complementary parameterizations of the cost
functions. Intuitively, these parametersmeasure the “variance” of the average cost-share c(S)/|S|,
over all agent sets S. We introduce two such notions, which we term α-average decreasing and
α-average min-bounded (see Definition 3.3 and Definition 4.2, respectively). We note that for
every cost function, there exist respective values of α (possibly different for each definition) for
which these properties are satisfied. These definitions provide an alternative way to classify
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cost functions and their respective approximation guarantees in terms of budget balance and
social cost.
Using the above ideas, in Section 3, we derive a scheme for ascending cost sharing mechanisms,
which can be seen as a (non-trivial) adaptation of the Moulin-Shenker mechanisms from the binary
accept/reject setting to combinatorial cost sharing. Our notion of trace-monotonic cost shares plays
a crucial role here. We show that our proposed mechanism is applicable for any non-decreasing cost
function and for symmetric submodular valuations (i.e., submodular functions whose value depends
only on the cardinality of the set).
By exploiting the first parameterization ofα-average decreasing cost functions, ourmain result of
Section 3 is that for α =O(1), our mechanism is polynomial-time, weakly group-strategyproof, O(1)-
budget-balanced andO(Hn)-approximate with respect to social cost, where n is the number of agents
1. As a consequence, if both the valuation and cost functions are symmetric submodular (α= 1), the
mechanism is budget-balanced and Hn-approximate. This is best possible even for a single item, as
there exist corresponding inapproximability results by Dobzinski et al. [7]. Prior to our work, the best
known mechanism for symmetric submodular valuation and cost functions is Hn-budget balanced
and Hn-approximate [8]. We anticipate that further extensions and generalizations might be feasible
through our framework and this type of ascending mechanisms.
In Section 4, we exploit our second parameterization of α-average min-bounded cost functions,
and provide results for general valuation functions. As it turns out, our parameterization enables us
to obtain a more fine-grained analysis of the Sequential Mechanism introduced by Moulin [17]. This
mechanism is budget-balanced by construction, but in general only guarantees a poor social cost
approximation of factor n. We show that for α-average min-bounded cost functions with α =O(1),
the Sequential Mechanism is budget balanced and Hn-approximate with respect to social cost. In-
terestingly, this result does not even require monotonicity of the valuation functions. In addition, we
can push our results even a bit further by introducing a refinement of this class of cost functions (see
Definition 4.7) for which we show that the Sequential Mechanism is O(1)-approximate. The refine-
ment allows us to obtain improved mechanisms for several cost functions originating from combi-
natorial optimization problems. For example, our result implies that the Sequential Mechanism is
d-approximate for certain cost-sharing variants of Vertex Cover and Set Cover, where d is the maxi-
mum degree of a node or themaximum size of a set, respectively; this improves upon existing results,
even in the well-studied single-item case, when d is constant.
In general, the twoparameterizations of the cost functions introduced in thiswork seem to be suit-
able means to accurately capture the approximation guarantees of both the ascending cost-sharing
mechanism of Section 3, and the Sequential Mechanism of Section 4. In fact, we have not managed
to construct natural examples of cost functions which do not admit anO(Hn)-approximation by nei-
ther of the mechanisms studied here. See also the discussion in Section 5, where some examples are
constructed but they are rather artificial (Proposition 5.1). As such, these parameterizations help us
to narrow down the class of cost functions which are not yet known to admit a good social cost ap-
proximation and enhance our understanding towards further progress in combinatorial cost sharing.
Related Work. For the single-item setting and with submodular cost functions, the best known
group-strategyproof and budget balanced cost-sharing mechanism is arguably the Shapley value
mechanism, introduced byMoulin and Shenker [17, 18]. Thiswas also the first work that tried to quan-
tify the efficiency loss of budget balanced cost-sharing mechanisms. Later, Feigenbaum et al. [10]
showed that if one insists on truthfulness, there is no mechanism that achieves a finite approxima-
tion of the social welfare objective, even if one relaxes the budget balance property to cost recovery.
To overcome this impossibility result, Roughgarden et al. [20] introduced the notion of social cost as
an alternative means to quantify the efficiency of a mechanism. In the same work, they showed that
the Shapley valuemechanism is Hn-approximate with respect to this objective. Dobzinski et al. [7] es-
tablished another impossibility result for the social cost objective, and showed that everymechanism
1We use Hn to denote the n-th Harmonic number defined as Hn = 1+ 12 +·· · + 1n .
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satisfying truthfulness and cost recovery cannot achieve a social cost approximation guarantee better
thanΩ(logn). The problem of derivingmechanisms with the best possible budget balance and social
cost approximation guarantees for different cost functions arising from combinatorial optimization
problems has been extensively studied in various works, see e.g., [2, 3, 4, 13].
Moving beyond the single-item case, Mehta et al. [16] introduced a new family of truthful mecha-
nisms (called acyclicmechanisms)which apply to general demand settings ofmultiple identical items
when players have symmetric submodular valuations. For additional works that consider the general
demand setting, the reader is referred to [2, 3, 6, 17]. Birmpas et al. [1] also studied families of valu-
ation and cost functions for the multiple item setting, under cost sharing models that are motivated
by applications in participatory sensing environments.
Most related to our work is the recent work by Dobzinski and Ovadia [8]. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the only prior work that considers a more general approach for combinatorial cost shar-
ing. They studied a multi-parameter setting and proposed a new VCG-based mechanism. Basically,
the idea is to run a VCGmechanism [5, 12, 21] with respect to a modified objective function which is
defined as the sum of the player valuations minus a potential. Intuitively, the latter ensures that the
payments computed by the mechanism cover the actual cost. They showed that this mechanism is
strategyproof and Hn-approximate with respect to social cost. They also identified several classes of
valuation and cost functions for which the mechanism is Hn-budget balanced. In particular, this is
the case if the valuation and cost functions are symmetric.2 Additionally, they established that their
mechanism is optimal with respect to the social cost approximation among all symmetric VCG-based
mechanisms that always cover the cost.
2 Definitions and Notation
Weassume there is a setN = {1,2, . . . ,n} of players and a setM = {1,2, . . . ,m} of items. Each item can be
viewed as a public good or some service that can be shared by the players. Each player i has a private
valuation function vi : 2
M →R≥0 specifying the value that she derives from each subset of items.
A cost-sharing mechanism takes as input the declared (possibly false) valuation functions b =
(bi )i∈N of the players and outputs (i) an allocation that determines which players share each item
and (ii) a payment pi for each player i . An allocation is denoted by a tuple A = (A1, . . . ,An), where
Ai ⊆M is the set of items provided to player i . For notational convenience, we also represent an allo-
cation A = (Ai )i∈N as a tuple over the items space (T1, . . . ,Tm) such that for every item j ∈M , T j ⊆ N
is the subset of players sharing item j , i.e., T j = {i ∈N : j ∈ Ai }.
In this paper, we consider mostly separable cost functions. In the separable setting, we assume
that the overall cost of an allocation decomposes into the cost for providing each item separately.
Hence, every item j is associated to a known cost function c j : 2
N → R≥0, which specifies for each
set of players T ⊆ N , the cost c j (T ) of providing item j to the players in T . Thus, the total cost of an
allocation A is defined as
C (A)=
∑
j∈M
c j (T j ) (1)
In Section 4.3, we also consider the non-separable setting, where we are given a more general cost
function C : (2M )n → R≥0, specifying for every allocation A = (Ai )i∈N the corresponding cost C (A).
Non-separable functions can capture dependencies among different items.
We assume that the utility functions of the players are quasilinear, i.e., given an allocation A =
(Ai )i∈N and payments (pi )i∈N determined by the mechanism for valuation functions v= (vi )i∈N , the
utility of player i is defined as ui (v)= vi (Ai )−pi . All ourmechanisms have no positive transfers (NPT),
i.e., pi ≥ 0, and satisfy individual rationality (IR), i.e., pi ≤ vi (Ai ).
In addition to the above, we are also interested in the following properties:
2We note that their definition of symmetry for the cost function differs from the one we use here.
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• WeakGroup-Strategyproofness (WGSP):We insist on a stronger notion of resistance tomanip-
ulation than truthfulness: A mechanism is weakly group-strategyproof if there is no deviation
by a coalition of players thatmakes all its members strictly better off. More formally, we require
that for every coalitionQ ⊆N of players, every profile v−Q of the other players, there is no devi-
ation bQ of the players inQ such that ui (bQ ,v−Q )> ui (vQ ,v−Q) for every i ∈Q , where vQ is the
profile of the actual valuation functions ofQ .
• Budget Balance: We are interested in mechanisms whose payments cover the allocation cost,
ideally exactly. However, the latter is not always possible as it may be incompatible with the
other objectives. We therefore consider an approximate budget balance notion: A mechanism
is β-budget-balanced (β ≥ 1) if for every valuation profile v = (vi )i∈N , the outcome (A,p) com-
puted by themechanism satisfies
C (A)≤
∑
i∈N
pi ≤β ·C (A). (2)
Clearly, we want β to be as small as possible to not overcharge players too much for covering
the cost. We say that the mechanism is budget balanced if β= 1.
• Economic Efficiency: Our goal is to compute outcomes that are (approximately) efficient. To
this aim, weuse the social cost objective, originally defined in [20]. Adapted to our combinatorial
setting, the social cost of an allocation A = (Ai )i∈N is defined as the actual cost of the outcome
plus the value missed by not serving all items to all players, i.e.,
π(A)=
∑
j∈M
c j (T j )+
∑
i∈N
[vi (M )−vi (Si )].3 (3)
A mechanism is said to be α-approximate with respect to the social cost objective if for every
valuation profile v= (vi )i∈N , the allocation A output by themechanism satisfies
π(A)≤α ·π(A∗), (4)
where A∗ is an allocation of minimum social cost.
We assume that both the valuation functions (vi )i∈N and the cost functions (c j ) j∈M are non-
decreasing (see below for formal definitions). Further, we focus on certain classes of valuation and
cost functions: More specifically, we consider submodular and subadditive cost functions, both natu-
rally modeling economies of scale. As to the valuation functions, we consider submodular valuation
functions in Section 3 and general valuation functions in Section 4. Further, the class of symmetric
XOS functions play a prominent role in Section 3.4 Below we summarize all relevant definitions (see
also Lehman et al. [15]).
Definition 2.1. Let f : 2U →R≥0 be a function defined over subsets of a universeU.
1. f is non-decreasing if f (S)≤ f (T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆U.
2. f is symmetric if f (S)= f (T ) for every S,T ⊆U with |S| = |T |.
3. f is submodular if f (S∪ {i })− f (S)≥ f (T ∪ {i })− f (T ) for every S ⊆ T ⊆U and i 6∈ S.
4. f is XOS if there are additive functions f 1, . . . , f k such that f (S)=maxi∈[k] f i (S) for all S ⊆U.
5. f is subadditive if f (S∪T )≤ f (S)+ f (T ) for every S,T ⊆U.
6. f is symmetric XOS if it is symmetric and f (S)/|S| ≥ f (T )/|T | for every S ⊆ T ⊆U.
Some of ourmechanismsmake use of cross-monotonic cost-sharing functions defined as follows:
3Note that this adaptationwas proposed in [8].
4It is not hard to verify that these functions can equivalently be defined as stated in Definition 2.1 (see also [9]).
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Algorithm 1: Iterative Ascending Cost SharingMechanism (IACSM)
Input: Declared valuation functions (bi )i∈N .
Output: Allocation A = (Ai )i∈N and payments p = (pi )i∈N .
1 Initialization: Let X =N be the set of active players and define T j =N for every item j ∈M .
2 while X 6= ; do
3 Compute an optimal bundle Ai for every player i ∈ X :
Ai ∈ argmax
S⊆M
{bi (S)−pi (S)}, where pi (S)=
∑
j∈S
χ j (T j ) (5)
(If there are several optimal bundles, resolve ties as described within Section 3.1.)
4 Let i∗ ∈ X be a player such that |Ai∗ | ≤ |Ai | for every i ∈ X .
5 Assign the items in Ai∗ to player i
∗ and remove player i∗ from X .
6 For every item j ∈M \ Ai∗ , set T j = T j \ {i∗}, and update the cost shares χ j (T j ).
7 return A = (Ai )i∈N and p = (pi )i∈N , where pi =
∑
j∈Ai χ j (T j ).
Definition 2.2. Let c : 2N → R≥0 be a cost function. A cost-sharing function5 χ : N ×2N → R≥0 with
respect to c specifies for each subset S ⊆N and every player i ∈ S a non-negative cost share χ(i ,S) such
that
∑
i∈S χ(i ,S) = c(S).6 χ is cross-monotonic if for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N and every i ∈ S, we have χ(i ,S) ≥
χ(i ,T ).
3 An Iterative Ascending Cost SharingMechanism
In this section, we present our Iterative Ascending Cost Sharing Mechanism (IACSM) for the combina-
torial cost sharing setting with symmetric submodular valuations and general cost functions. We first
provide a generic description of our mechanism and identify two properties which are sufficient for
our main result to go through. We then show that these properties are satisfied if the valuations are
symmetric submodular.
3.1 Definition of IACSM
Mechanism IACSM can be viewed as a generalization of theMoulin-Shenker mechanism [18] to the
combinatorial setting in the sense that it simulates in parallel an ascending iterative auction for each
item. To our knowledge this is the first ascending price mechanism for the combinatorial setting
which is not VCG-based and as we will describe below, this adaptation is not straightforward since
there are several obstacles we need to overcome. A description of our mechanism IACSM is given in
Algorithm 1.
Themechanismmaintains a set of active players X and for each item j ∈M a set of players T j who
are tentatively assigned to j . Initially, each player is active and tentatively assigned to all the items,
i.e., X = N and T j = N for all j ∈M . The mechanism then proceeds in iterations. In each iteration,
each item j is offered to each active player i ∈ X at a price that only depends on the set of tentatively
assigned players T j . For this, we use a player-independent cost sharing function χ j (·,T j ) for every
item j , and since we require that χ j (i ,T j ) = χ j (k ,T j ) for every i ,k ∈ T j , we will simply denote by
χ j (T j ) the cost share that each player i ∈ T j tentatively assigned to j has to pay. Based on these cost
shares, every active player i ∈ X computes an optimal bundle Ai with respect to the payments pi (·), as
defined in Equation (5). If there are ties, we resolve them according to the following tie-breaking rule:
if there are several optimal bundles, then player i chooses one of maximum size. If there are multiple
optimal bundles of maximum size k , then she chooses the bundle consisting of the k cheapest items
(where ties between equal cost share items are resolved consistently, say by index of the items).
5We stress here that it is also possible for cost-sharing methods to overcharge, something that leads to approximate
budget balancedmechanisms.
6For notational convenience, we define χ(i ,S)=∞ for i ∉ S.
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After determining the optimal bundle for each active player, the mechanism then chooses an
active player i∗ whose optimal bundle has minimum size. Again, we break ties consistently, say by
index of the players. The items in Ai∗ are assigned to player i
∗ and i∗ becomes inactive. Finally, for
every item j which is not part of the optimal bundle Ai∗ , i
∗ is removed from the tentative set T j . The
mechanism terminates when all players are inactive.
3.2 Two Crucial Properties
In this section we identify two crucial properties that ourmechanism has to satisfy for ourmain result
to go through. To formalize these properties, we introduce first somemore notation.
Trace of IACSM. Note that the execution of our mechanism IACSM on an instance of the problem
induces an order τ = (τ1, . . . ,τn) on the players. Without loss of generality, we may assume that the
players are renamed such that τ= (1, . . . ,n), i.e., player i becomes inactive in iteration i ; however, we
emphasize that this order is determined by the run of our mechanism.
The order τ = (1, . . . ,n) together with the final bundle Ai assigned to each player i at the end of
iteration i induces an order of player withdrawals for each item j . More precisely, for every j ∈ M
we let τ j be the subsequence of τ consisting only of the players who withdrew from item j (at the
end of the iteration when they became inactive). We refer to τ j as the trace of item j . Recall that
initially T j = N and hence all players are tentatively assigned to j . The length of τ j can vary from 0,
when nobody withdraws from item j and τ j is the null sequence, all the way to n, when everybody
withdraws from j and τ j = τ. Given a trace τ j in the form τ j = (i1, i2, . . . , iℓ) and k ∈ {0,1, . . . , |τ j |}, let
Rk
j
= N \ {i1, i2, . . . , ik }; define R0j = N . Note that the set Rkj is precisely the set of players tentatively
assigned to j after k players have withdrawn from j during the execution of themechanism. We note
that the notion of trace is valid also for any other iterative mechanism where the assignment of one
player becomes finalized at each iteration, e.g., [16].
Trace-monotonic cost sharing functions. We introduce a new property of cost sharing functions
whichwill turn out to be crucial below. Intuitively, it is a refinement of the standard cross-monotonicity
propertywhich has to hold only for certain subsets of players encountered by themechanism, namely
for the sets {Rk
j
}. More precisely, given a trace τ j for an item j ∈M , we say that the cost sharing func-
tion χ j is cross-monotonic with respect to τ j (or, trace-monotonic for short), if
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , |τ j |−1} : χ j (Rkj )≤ χ j (Rk+1j ).
Note that this ensures that the cost share of item j (weakly) increases during the execution of the
mechanism, as we consider the sequence of sets
R0j ⊃R1j ⊃ ·· · ⊃R
|τ j |
j
.
A subtle point here is that the definition of the cost share χ j (R
k
j
) may not only depend on the set of
players Rk
j
, but also on the trace τ j specifying how the set R
k
j
has been reached by the mechanism.7
It will become clear below that this additional flexibility enables us to implement our mechanism for
arbitrary cost functions.
Properties (P1) and (P2). Our first property is rather intuitive: An item j needs to be offered to all
active players at the sameprice and this price can only increase in subsequent iterations. In particular,
this ensures that if at the end of iteration i , player i withdraws from an item j ∈M \Ai , then the price
of j for the remaining players in T j \{i } does not decrease. This is crucial to achieve strategyproofness,
and it is captured precisely by trace-monotonic cost sharing functions.8
7Notationally, we would have to write here χ
τ j
j
to indicate the dependency on τ j . However, in the analysis we focus on a
fixed trace produced by an execution of themechanism and omit the explicit reference to it for notational convenience.
8Note that we have to require trace-monotonicity with respect to an arbitrary trace of item j here, because we cannot
control the trace τ j that will be realized by IACSM.
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(P1) For each item j ∈M the cost sharing function χ j is trace monotonic for every trace τ j .
The first property alone is not sufficient to ensure that our mechanism IACSM is weakly group-
strategyproof (or even strategyproof). Additionally, we need to enforce the following refinement prop-
erty on the final bundles assigned to the players. We prove below that Property (P2) is satisfied for
symmetric submodular valuation functions.
(P2) The final bundles (Ai )i∈N assigned to the players satisfy the following refinement property: Ai ⊆
Ai+1 for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}.
3.3 Feasibility of (P1) and (P2)
Wenext define the cost sharing function thatwe use. The intuition is as follows: Suppose that S =T j is
the set of players who are tentatively allocated to item j at the beginning of iteration i for some i ∈ [n].
Ideally, we would like to charge the average cost c j (S)/|S| to each player in S, but we cannot simply
do this because the average cost might decrease with respect to the previous iteration, and this will
destroy Property (P1). Given our newnotion of trace-monotonicity,we can resolve this by defining the
cost share of item j as themaximum average cost over all player sets which were tentatively allocated
to j so far.
More formally, let τ j be the trace of item j induced by IACSM when executed on a given instance.
Let S be the set of players tentatively assigned to item j at the beginning of iteration i , and fix k such
that Rk
j
= S (by the definition of our mechanism, such a k must exist and k ≤ i −1). We define
χ j (S)= max
ℓ∈{0,...,k}
c j (R
ℓ
j
)
|n−ℓ| . (6)
Note that by using this definition we may end up overcharging the actual cost c j (S) of item j
in the sense that |S| ·χ j (S) > c j (S). As we show in Section 3.4, the budget balance and social cost
approximation guarantees depend on themagnitude by which we might overcharge.
It is now trivial to show that Property (P1) holds.
Lemma 3.1. Consider some item j ∈M and let c j : 2N →R≥0 be an arbitrary cost function. Let τ j be an
arbitrary trace of j . The cost sharing function χ j defined in (6) is trace-monotonic.
Proof. By definition (6), we have for every k ∈ {0, . . . , |τ j |−1}
χ j (R
k
j )= max
ℓ∈{0,...,k}
c j (R
ℓ
j
)
|n−ℓ| ≤ maxℓ∈{0,...,k+1}
c j (R
ℓ
j
)
|n−ℓ| = χ j (R
k+1
j ).
We turn to Property (P2). In general, it seems difficult to guarantee (P2), but it is not hard to see
that it holds if the valuation functions are symmetric submodular.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose the valuation functions are symmetric submodular. Then Ai ⊆ Ai+1 for every
i ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1}.
Proof. Fix some i ∈ {1, . . . ,n−1} and consider players i and i+1. Note that both i and i+1 are active at
the beginning of iteration i . Let Ai and A
′
i+1 be the optimal bundles chosen by i and i +1 in iteration
i , respectively. Because i is chosen, we have |Ai | ≤ |A′i+1|. Further, because the valuation functions
are symmetric, Ai consists of the |Ai | smallest cost share items (by our tie-breaking rule). Similarly,
A′
i+1 consists of the |A′i+1| smallest cost share items. We conclude that Ai ⊆ A′i+1. (Note that here
we exploit that if there are several optimal bundles for player i +1, then the one of maximum size is
chosen.)
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Note that at the end of iteration i , player i becomes inactive and withdraws from the items in
A′
i+1 \ Ai . By trace-monotonicity (Property (P1)), the cost shares of these items do not decrease in
iteration i +1. Also, the cost shares of all items in Ai remain the same.
Consider now player i +1 in iteration i +1. By using similar arguments, it follows that the optimal
bundle Ai+1 consists of the |Ai+1| lowest cost share items. But note that in iteration i , the optimal
bundle A′
i+1 of player i +1 contained all the items of Ai and possibly a few more. Since the items of
Ai continue to be the ones of smallest cost share, the optimal bundle of i +1 in iteration i +1 must
still contain all the items in Ai . (Note that here we again exploit that the optimal bundle of maximum
size is chosen if there are ties.) Thus it must hold that Ai+1 ⊇ Ai .
3.4 Main result for IACSM
In order to state our main result of this section, we need to introduce a crucial parameter that deter-
mines the budget balance and social cost approximation guarantees of our mechanism.
Definition 3.3. A cost function c : 2N → R≥0 is α-average-decreasing if there exists some α ≥ 1 such
that for every S ⊆ T ⊆N, α · c(S)|S| ≥
c(T )
|T | .
Note that for every cost function c there exists some α ≥ 1 such that c is α-average decreasing.
However, here we are particularly interested in α-average decreasing cost functions for which the
parameter α is small, as can be seen by Theorem 3.4 below. Average decreasing functions with small
values ofα arise naturally in the domains of digital goods and public goods. For digital goods the cost
of serving a non-empty set of customers is typically assumed to be constant because there is a cost for
producing the good and then it can be sharedwith no additional cost (hence the definition is satisfied
with α= 1). The same is applicable for some public good models. Note also that symmetric XOS cost
functions (see Definition 2.1) are average-decreasing (i.e., α= 1).
The following is the main result of this section.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose the valuation functions are symmetric submodular and the cost functions are
α-average decreasing. Then the mechanism IACSM runs in polynomial time, satisfies IR, NPT, WGSP
and is α-budget balanced and 2α3Hn-approximate.
Symmetric submodular cost functions are average decreasing (i.e., α= 1) since they are a subclass
of symmetric XOS functions. As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary from Theorem 3.4
(with an additional improvement on the social cost approximation).
Corollary 3.5. Suppose the valuation functions and the cost functions are symmetric submodular.
Then the mechanism IACSM runs in polynomial time, satisfies IR, NPT, WGSP and is budget balanced
and Hn-approximate.
Proof. Applying Theorem 3.4 with α = 1, we get immediately all the claimed properties except for
the social cost approximation which is 2Hn . However, we note that for symmetric submodular cost
functions the term 2α in Lemma 3.14 (see Section 3.7) can simply be omitted, because we have c(S)≤
c(T ) for any two sets S,T with |S| ≤ |T |. By exploiting this in the remaining proof of the social cost
approximation guarantee, we obtain an Hn-approximation.
Note that the approximation factor of Hn for symmetric submodular functions is tight: The im-
possibility result of Dobzinski et al. [7] for a single public good implies that achieving a better approx-
imation ratio is impossible, even in the single-item case (m = 1).
Finally we point out thatα-average-decreasing functions are subadditive when α= 1, while this is
not necessarily true for α> 1.
Lemma 3.6. Let c(·) be an α-average-decreasing cost function where α = 1. Then c(·) is subadditive
and in addition, not necessarily symmetric, or submodular. In case c(·) is α-average-decreasing with
α> 1, then c(·) is not necessarily subadditive.
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Proof. Let S,T ⊆N and assume without loss of generality that c(S)|S| ≤
c(T )
|T | . Using that the average cost
of c is non-increasing, we obtain
c(S∪T )≤ |S∪T | · c(S)|S| ≤ c(S)+|T |
c(S)
|S| ≤ c(S)+c(T ).
Hence c is subadditive.
We construct now an example of a non-symmetric and non-submodular cost function that is
average-decreasing. Let N = {1,2,3} and consider the function c defined as follows: c({1})= 5, c({2})=
7, c({3}) = 8, c({1,2}) = 10, c({2,3}) = c({1,3}) = 9, and c({1,2,3}) = 11. It is easy to verify that c has de-
creasing average cost, but obviously, it is not a symmetric function; in fact, it is not even submodular
because c({1,2,3})−c({1,3}) = 11−9= 2> 1= 9−8= c({2,3})−c({3}).
Finally consider the following example:
c(S)=


0 if S =;
1 if |S| = 1,2
3 if |S| ≥ 3
It is easy to see that this function is 2-average-decreasing (just consider sets of cardinality 2 and
supersets of cardinality 3 and notice that this case gives the maximum possible α). Regarding non-
subadditivity, consider sets S ⊆T ⊆N where |S| = 1, |T | = 2 and S∩T =;. We have that c(S∪T )= 3>
2= 1+1= c(S)+c(T ).
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.4. Unless stated otherwise,
we assume below that the valuation functions are symmetric submodular and the cost functions are
α-average decreasing.
3.5 Computational Efficiency
We argue that IACSM can be implemented in polynomial time. Clearly, the mechanism terminates
after n iterations. In each iteration, the only non-trivial operations are (i) to compute the optimal
bundles for all active players (Line 3) and (ii) to update the cost shares of the items (Line 6). All other
operations can be implemented to run in timeO(n+m). We prove below that (i) and (ii) can be done
in polynomial time.
We first show that optimal bundles can be computed efficiently if the valuation functions are
symmetric submodular.
Lemma 3.7. If the valuation functions are symmetric submodular, then an optimal bundle for player
i can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Fix an arbitrary iteration and let i ∈ X be an active player. We need to show that we can effi-
ciently compute an optimal bundle as defined in (5). Recall that the value that player i derives from a
bundle of items only depends on its cardinality (because the valuation functions are symmetric sub-
modular). Thus, to build an optimal bundle, we can start with the empty set and iteratively add an
item of lowest price as long as this price is at most the added marginal value. As a result, the value
of the constructed bundle (weakly) increases whenever we add a new item. At the same time, the
marginal value of the added items (weakly) decreases because of submodularity. Thus, the first time
we consider an item whose marginal value is (strictly) less than its price, we have to stop as the utility
can only decrease if we add any of the remaining items. Note that the optimal bundle constructed in
this way satisfies the tie-breaking rule described above. Clearly, this procedure stops after at mostm
iterations.
We note that for non-symmetric valuation functions, the complexity of IACSM depends on the
time needed to compute an optimal bundle. For example, if one has access to demand queries, we
can still have an efficient implementation with polynomially many queries.
10
We next turn to the computation of the cost shares. Note that in general it is not clear whether
the cost shares as defined in (6) can be computed efficiently (as there might be exponentially many
supersets that need to be considered). However, as we show below, the cost shares of the items which
are constructed throughout the execution of our mechanism IACSM can be computed efficiently.
Lemma 3.8. The cost shares as defined in (6) can be computed efficiently throughout the execution of
mechanism IACSM.
Proof. Let τ = (1,2, . . . ,n) be the player order induced by IACSM. Fix an arbitrary item j ∈M . After
the initialization, we have T j = N and the cost share of j is thus χ j (R0j ) = c j (N )/|N |. Clearly, as long
as the set of players T j who are tentatively assigned to item j does not change, the cost share of j
remains the same. Suppose that T j changes at the end of iteration i because player i withdraws from
item j , resulting in a new set T ′
j
= T j \{i }. The new cost share χ j (T ′j ) of item j can then be determined
simply by taking themaximum of the current cost share χ j (T j ) and c j (T
′
j
)/|T ′
j
|. Note that this update
ensures that the cost share definition in (6) is met.
3.6 IR, NPT andWGSP
The individual rationality and the no positive transfers properties follow directly from the definition
of the mechanism. TheWGSP property is established by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.9. Mechanism IACSM is weakly group-strategyproof.
Proof. Fix a coalition Q ⊆ N . Let I be the instance in which all players in Q report their valuations
truthfully and let Iˆ be an instance in which all players in Q misreport their valuations. We need to
prove that not every player i ∈Q strictly improves her utility by misreporting.
Consider the runs of IACSM on instances I and Iˆ , respectively. Let τ and τˆ be the player orders
induced by IACSM for I and Iˆ , respectively. We assume without loss of generality that in the run on
I , player i is considered in iteration i , i.e., τ= (1, . . . ,n). 9 Let τˆ= (τˆ1, . . . , τˆn) be the order in which the
players are considered in the run on Iˆ . Let i be the first iteration in which either (a) the considered
players i and τˆi differ, i.e., i 6= τˆi , or (b) the same player i = τˆi is considered, but the bundles allocated
in I and Iˆ differ. Note that such an i must exist as otherwise both runs return the same allocation and
we are done. By the choice of i , at the beginning of iteration i the cost share of each item is the same
in I and Iˆ , and can only increase subsequently. We distinguish two cases:
Case 1: i ∈Q. The bundle Ai allocated to player i in I is chosen such that
vi (Ai )−pi (Ai )≥ vi (S)−pi (S) ∀S ⊆M , (7)
where pi (S) is the sum of the cost shares of the items in S in iteration i in I (which are the same as in
Iˆ ). Suppose player i is considered in iteration k in the run on Iˆ , i.e., τˆk = i . By the choice of i , we have
k ≥ i . Thus, in iteration k in Iˆ the price pˆi (S) of i for each bundle S ⊆M must satisfy pˆi (S)≥ pi (S). In
particular, for the bundle Aˆi allocated to player i in iteration k in Iˆ we have
vi (Aˆi )− pˆi (Aˆi )≤ vi (Aˆi )−pi (Aˆi )≤ vi (Ai )−pi (Ai ),
where the last inequality follows from (7). The claim follows because i is part of the deviating coalition
Q .
Case 2: i ∉Q. We first argue that player k = τˆi ∈Q . Assume that k ∉Q . Then both i and k bid
truthfully in iteration i in I and Iˆ . Because in iteration i the cost shares are the same in both runs,
the bundles chosen by i in I and Iˆ are the same. The same holds for player k . If i 6= k then this is a
contradiction to the assumption that IACSMuses a consistent tie breaking rule (as i is chosen in I but
9Note that themechanismmight terminate before iteration n, but for the analysis it will be convenient to assume that it
uses exactly n iterations. Conceptually, simply assume that the players who become inactive all at once in the final iteration
are removed one-by-one (using an arbitrary but consistent tie breaking rule).
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k in Iˆ ). If i = k then this is a contradiction to our choice of iteration i (as i chooses the same bundle
in I and Iˆ ). We conclude that k ∈Q .
We now compare the utility obtained by player k = τˆi ∈Q in I and Iˆ . Note that k 6= i because k ∈Q
and i ∉Q . Observe that in iteration i in instance Iˆ , player i reports truthfully and thus opts for the
same bundle Ai as in iteration i in I . Given that player k is chosen in iteration i in Iˆ (and not player
i ), the bundle Aˆk allocated to k satisfies Aˆk ⊆ Ai .
Now, consider the run on I and let k > i be the iteration in which player k = τˆi is considered. By
Property (P2), we have Ai ⊆ Ak . We conclude that Aˆk ⊆ Ak . Because k reports truthfully in I , the
choice of Ak implies that
vk(Ak )−pk (Ak )≥ vk(S)−pk(S) ∀S ⊆M .
In particular, for the bundle Aˆk this implies that
vk(Ak )−vk(Aˆk )−pk (Ak \ Aˆk )≥ 0. (8)
Further, note that the cost shares of all items in Ai and Aˆk remain the same as in iteration i in the runs
on I and Iˆ , respectively. Exploiting that Aˆk ⊆ Ai and that the cost shares in iteration i are the same in
both runs, we conclude that pk (Aˆk )= pˆk(Aˆk ). We obtain
vk(Ak )−pk (Ak )= vk(Aˆk )−pk(Aˆk )+ [vk(Ak )−vk(Aˆk )−pk (Ak \ Aˆk )]
≥ vk(Aˆk )−pk(Aˆk )= vk(Aˆk )− pˆk (Aˆk ),
where the first equality holds because pk is additive and the inequality follows from (8). The claim
now follows because k ∈Q .
3.7 Budget Balance and Social Cost Approximation
We start by providing the budget balance performance of the mechanism.
Lemma 3.10. Mechanism IACSM is α-budget balanced.
Proof. Let the player order induced by IACSM be τ= (1, . . . ,n). Fix an arbitrary item j and let τ j be the
trace of item j . Let T j be the final set of players allocated to item j and recall that R
k
j
= T j for k = |τ j |.
By the definition of the cost sharing function χ j in (6), there is some set S =Rℓj with ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,k} such
that the cost share of item j is
χ j (T j )=
c j (R
ℓ
j
)
n−ℓ ≥
c j (R
k
j
)
n−k =
c j (T j )
|T j |
. (9)
Summing over all players in T j , we obtain
c j (T j )≤
∑
i∈T j
χ j (T j )= |T j | ·
c j (S)
|S| ≤ |T j | ·α
c j (T j )
|T j |
=α ·c j (T j ), (10)
where the second inequality holds because c j is α-average-decreasing and T j ⊆ S.
Finally, summing inequality (10) over all items j ∈M we obtain
∑
j∈M
c j (T j )≤
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈T j
χ j (T j )≤α
∑
j∈M
c j (T j ), (11)
which proves the claim.
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We now show that our mechanism IACSM is 2α3Hn-approximate with respect to the social cost ob-
jective for symmetric submodular valuation functions.
Let A = (Ai )i∈N be the allocation computed by the mechanism, where Ai ⊆ M is the subset of
items that player i receives. As before, without loss of generality we assume that the player order
induced by IACSM is τ = (1, . . . ,n). Recall that for every item j ∈M , T j = {i ∈ N : j ∈ Ai } is the final
set of players that receive item j . We also use T i
j
to refer to the subset of players who are allocated to
item j at the beginning of iteration i . Clearly, T i
j
⊇ T j for every player i and item j .
We first prove some lemmas which will be helpful later on.
Lemma 3.11. Fix an item j ∈M and let i be the first player in τ such that j ∈ Ai . Then T j = {i , . . . ,n}.
Proof. By the choice of i , we have that j ∈ Ai and j ∉ Ak for every player k < i . From Property (P2) it
follows that for every k with i ≤ k < n, Ak ⊆ Ak+1. Thus j ∈ Ak for every i ≤ k ≤ n, which concludes
the proof.
Lemma 3.12. Consider player i who becomes inactive in iteration i . We have
vi (Ai )−
∑
j∈Ai
χ j (T j )≥ vi (S)−
∑
j∈S
χ j (T j ) ∀S ⊆M .
Proof. In iteration i , the final bundle Ai is chosen as the set of items maximizing the utility of player
i with respect to the current cost shares, i.e.,
vi (Ai )−
∑
j∈Ai
χ j (T
i
j )≥ vi (S)−
∑
j∈S
χ j (T
i
j ) ∀S ⊆M . (12)
Recall that T i
j
is the set of players that are allocated to item j in iteration i . Note that by Lemma 3.11,
T i
j
= T j for every j ∈ Ai . Further, T ij ⊇ T j for every j ∈M \ Ai as additional players might withdraw
from j in subsequent iterations. Note that the final set T j is reached from T
i
j
by following the trace τ j
of item j . The claim now follows from the trace-monotonicity of χ j (Property (P1)).
Lemma 3.13. Consider player i who becomes inactive in iteration i . For every item j ∈M,
χ j (T
i
j )≤α
c j ({i , . . . ,n})
n− i +1 .
Proof. Fix some j ∈M . In iteration i , we have T i
j
⊇ {i , . . . ,n}. Let k be such that T i
j
=Rk
j
and recall that
Rℓ
j
⊇Rk
j
for every ℓ ∈ {0, . . . ,k}. We obtain
χ j (T
i
j )= max
ℓ∈{0,...,k}
c j (R
ℓ
j
)
n−ℓ ≤α
c j ({i , . . . ,n})
n− i +1 , (13)
where the inequality holds because c j is α-average decreasing.
Lemma 3.14. Let c be an α-average decreasing cost function. Let S,T ⊆ N be arbitrary subsets with
|S| ≤ |T |. Then c(S)≤ 2αc(T ).
Proof. Assume for the sake of a contradiction that c(S) > 2αc(T ). Consider the set S ∪T and note
that |S ∪T | ≤ 2|T |. Because c is non-decreasing, we have c(S ∪T ) ≥ c(S) > 2
α
c(T ). Using that c is
α-average-decreasing, we obtain c(S∪T )|S∪T | ≤α
c(T )
|T | , which implies that c(S∪T )≤α
|S∪T |
|T | c(T )≤ 2αc(T ), a
contradiction.
We are now ready to prove the approximation guarantee.
Lemma 3.15. Mechanisms IACSM is 2α3Hn-approximate.
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Proof. Let A∗ = (A∗1 , . . . ,A∗n) be an optimal allocation and let T ∗j be the respective set of players that
receive item j in A∗. We have
π(A)=
∑
i∈N
(
vi (M )−vi (Ai )
)
+
∑
j∈M
c j (T j )
≤
∑
i∈N
vi (M )−
∑
i∈N
(
vi (Ai )−
∑
j∈Ai
χ j (T j )
)
≤
∑
i∈N
vi (M )−
∑
i∈N
(
vi (A
∗
i )−
∑
j∈A∗
i
χ j (T
i
j )
)
=
∑
i∈N
(
vi (M )−vi (A∗i )
)
+
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈A∗
i
χ j (T
i
j ),
where the first inequality holds because χ j is α-budget balanced and the second inequality follows
from (12) in the proof of Lemma 3.12.
The proof follows if we can show that
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈A∗
i
χ j (T
i
j )≤ 2α3Hn
∑
j∈M
c j (T
∗
j ). (14)
We use a charging argument to prove (14). Fix some item j ∈ M and order the players in T ∗
j
according to the player order τ = (1, . . . ,n) induced by IACSM; let T ∗
j
= {i1, . . . , ik∗
j
} be the ordered set
with k∗
j
:= |T ∗
j
|. We now “tag” each player i in T ∗
j
with a fraction of the cost c j (T
∗
j
) for item j as follows:
For the l th player i = il in T ∗j with 1≤ l ≤ k∗j , define
tagi ( j ) :=
c j (T
∗
j
)
k∗
j
− l +1 . (15)
That is, the first player i1 in T
∗
j
is tagged with c j (T
∗
j
)/k∗
j
, the second player i2 with c j (T
∗
j
)/(k∗
j
−1) and
so forth, and the last player ik∗
j
is tagged with c j (T
∗
j
).
We first derive two lower bounds on the tagged cost:
Claim 3.16. For every player i ∈N and for every item j ∈ A∗
i
:
tagi ( j )≥
c j (T
∗
j
)
n− i +1 and tagi ( j )≥
c j (T
∗
j
)
|T ∗
j
| .
Proof. The latter bound holds by definition (15). To see that the former bound holds, observe that the
kth last player (1≤ k ≤ k∗
j
) in the ordered set T ∗
j
is tagged by c j (T
∗
j
)/k . The claim now follows because
there are at most n− i players succeeding i in T ∗
j
according to the order.
Note that the total tagged cost of item j satisfies
∑
i∈T ∗
j
tagi ( j )=
k∗j∑
l=1
c j (T
∗
j
)
k∗
j
− l +1 ≤Hnc j (T
∗
j ). (16)
Thus, to prove (14) it suffices to show that the total cost share sum is upper bounded by the total
tagged cost, i.e., ∑
i∈N
∑
j∈A∗
i
χ j (T
i
j )≤ 2α3
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈T ∗
j
tagi ( j ). (17)
We show that for every i and every j ∈ A∗
i
, χ j (T
i
j
)≤ tagi ( j ). Summing over all i ∈ N and j ∈ A∗i then
proves (14).
We distinguish two cases:
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Algorithm 2: Sequential Mechanism (SM)
Input: Declared valuation functions (bi )i∈N .
Output: Allocation A = (Ai )i∈N and payments p = (pi )i∈N .
1 Initialization: Fix an order on the set of players N = {1, . . . ,n}.
2 for i = 1, . . . ,n do
3 Compute an optimal bundle Ai for player i :
Ai ∈ argmax
S⊆M
{bi (S)−pi (S)}, where
pi (S)=C (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,S,;, . . . ,;)−C (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,;, . . . ,;).
(If there are multiple optimal bundles, choose the lexicographically smallest one.)
4 return A = (Ai )i∈N and p = (pi )i∈N , where pi = pi (Ai ).
Case 1: |T ∗
j
| ≥ n− i +1: Let S ⊆ T ∗
j
be a set such that |S| = n− i +1. We have
χ j (T
i
j )≤α
c j ({i , . . . ,n})
n− i +1 ≤ 2α
2
c j (S)
|S| ≤ 2α
2
c j (T
∗
j
)
n− i +1 ≤ 2α
2
tagi ( j ), (18)
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.13, the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.14,
the third inequality holds because c j is non-decreasing and the last inequality follows fromClaim3.16.
Case 2: |T ∗
j
| < n− i +1: Let S ⊃ T ∗
j
be a set such that |S| = n− i +1. We have
χ j (T
i
j )≤α
c j ({i , . . . ,n})
n− i +1 ≤ 2α
2
c j (S)
|S| ≤ 2α
3
c j (T
∗
j
)
|T ∗
j
| ≤ 2α
3
tagi ( j ), (19)
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 3.13, the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.14,
the third inequality holds because c j is α-average-decreasing and the last inequality follows from
Claim 3.16. This concludes the proof.
4 Mechanisms for General Valuations and Subadditive Cost Functions
In this section, we move away from symmetric submodular valuation functions and derive results for
more general functions. In particular, we investigate the performance of the Sequential Mechanism
[17] for general valuations and subadditive cost functions. Although for arbitrary subadditive cost
functions this mechanism does not provide favorable approximation guarantees, we identify condi-
tions on the cost functions under which it achieves significantly better approximation factors. This is
based on considering a different parameterization of cost functions with regard to their average cost
shares.
4.1 The Sequential Mechanism
The SequentialMechanism (SM)was introduced byMoulin [17] and was also studied in [8]. A descrip-
tion of the mechanism SM is given in Algorithm 2. We note that this mechanism is applicable both
to separable and non-separable cost functions. Here, we first focus on separable cost functions. In
Section 4.3, we consider generalizations to the non-separable setting.
It is trivial to see that SM is budget-balanced and it is also known that it is WGSP [8]. However, for
arbitrarymonotone subadditive cost functions, themechanism achieves a (poor) social cost approxi-
mation guarantee of n only (see [8]).
Theorem 4.1. [8] Suppose we have general valuation functions and non-decreasing subadditive cost
functions. Then the Sequential Mechanism satisfies IR, NPT, WGSP, and is budget balanced and n-
approximate.
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Despite this, we show that SM has better guarantees under certain conditions. Namely, we iden-
tify a crucial parameter of each cost function c j with j ∈ M that allows us to quantify this improve-
ment. The parameterization introduced here is different from the one used in Section 3 and it com-
pares the average cost of a set T ⊆ N with the minimum standalone cost of a player in T . More
specifically, we define the following property:
Definition 4.2. A cost function c : 2N →R≥0 is α-average min-bounded, if there exists some α≥ 1 such
that for every set T ⊆N, we have α · c(T )|T | ≥ cmin, where cmin =min j∈T c({ j }).
Definition 4.2 may look somewhat contrived at first glance and we thus provide some more in-
tuition on how we arrived at this parameterization. Given that IACSM performs well for α-average
decreasing functions and small values of α (see Section 3), it is natural to focus on the complement
of this class. For example, fix α = 1 for now. Then the exact complement is not easy to characterize
because it involves two existential quantifiers. We therefore consider a subset of this complement
(with only one existential quantifier) by demanding that for every T , there exists S ⊆ T such that
c(S)/|S| < c(T )/|T |. It is not hard to verify that this definition is equivalent to the class of 1-average
min-bounded functions. For larger values of α, we can again see that α-average-min-bounded func-
tions capture a chunk of the complement of α-average-decreasing functions. Thus, a positive result
for α-average-min-bounded functions narrows down on the cost functions that are not yet known to
admit good approximation guarantees.
Note that for every cost function we can find an α≥ 1 such that it is α-average min-bounded. As
the next theorem reveals, the Sequential Mechanism attains a favorable performance for small values
of α.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose we have general valuation functions and for each item j ∈M, the cost function
c j : 2
N → R≥0 is non-decreasing, subadditive, and α-average min-bounded for some α ≥ 1. Then the
SequentialMechanism satisfies IR, NPT, WGSP, and is budget balanced and α ·Hn-approximate.
For the proof of Theorem 4.3, we use the following proposition:
Proposition 4.4. If c : 2N → R≥0 is non-decreasing and α-average min-bounded, then
∑
i∈T c({i }) ≤
αH|T | ·c(T ) for every T ⊆N.
Proof. Fix T ⊆ N and rename the players of T so that they are in decreasing order with respect to
the standalone cost, i.e., for any i , j ∈ T with i < j , it holds c({i }) ≥ c({ j }). For convenience, we may
assume that T = {1,2, . . . , |T |}. Fix some i ∈ T and consider the set {1,2, . . . , i }⊆ T . Note that in this set
player i has theminimum standalone cost c({i }). Hence, by Definition 4.2, the cost function satisfies:
c({i })≤α · c({1, . . . , i })
i
≤α · c(T )
i
,
where the last inequality holds because c is non-decreasing. The above inequality holds for any i ∈ T .
Summing over all players i ∈ T proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. We only need to prove that SM is αHn-approximate. All the other properties
have been established in [8, 17]. Let A = (Ai )i∈N be the allocation output by the mechanism and let
A∗ = (A∗
i
)i∈N be anoptimal allocation. Further, let T ∗j be the respective set of players that receive item
j in A∗. To simplify notation in the analysis, we also let A<i denote the tuple (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,;, . . . ,;).
Define now the incremental cost of a player i for a bundle S ⊆ M , with respect to the allocation
constructed by the Sequential Mechanism before i ’s turn as ∆i (A<i ,S) =C (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,S,;, . . . ,;)−
C (A1, . . . ,Ai−1,;, . . . ,;).
We have
π(A)=
∑
i∈N
[
vi (M )−vi (Ai )
]
+C (A)
=
∑
i∈N
vi (M )−
∑
i∈N
[
vi (Ai )−∆i (A<i ,Ai )
]
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≤
∑
i∈N
vi (M )−
∑
i∈N
[
vi (A
∗
i )−∆i (A<i ,A∗i )
]
=
∑
i∈N
[
vi (M )−vi (A∗i )
]
+
∑
i∈N
∆i (A<i ,A∗i ).
Note that the inequality holds because Ai was chosen as the optimal bundle for i . The next step is to
prove a bound on the incremental costs in the form
∑
i∈N
∆i (A<i ,A∗i )≤β ·C (A∗). (20)
The proof follows if we can show that (20) holds for β=αHn because we then have
π(A)≤
∑
i∈N
[
vi (M )−vi (A∗i )
]
+α ·HnC (A∗)≤αHn ·π(A∗).
By exploiting the subadditivity of the cost functions c j , we obtain
∆i (A<i ,A∗i )=C (A<i ,A∗i )−C (A<i )≤C (A<i )+C (A∗i ,;−i )−C (A<i )=
∑
j∈A∗
i
c j ({i }).
Summing over all i ∈N , and using Proposition 4.4, we get:
∑
i∈N
∆i (A<i ,A∗i )≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈A∗
i
c j ({i })=
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈T ∗
j
c j ({i })≤
∑
j∈M
αH|T ∗
j
|c j (T
∗
j )≤αHnC (A∗)
By going through the proof of Theorem 4.3 more carefully, we realize the following:
Remark 4.5. For any subclass of non-decreasing, subadditive cost functions, it suffices to establish
inequality (20) to prove that the Sequential Mechanism has a social cost approximation guarantee of
β.
We next prove that for α= 1 the approximation factor is tight.
Proposition 4.6. Even for the single item setting, there exists a 1-average min-bounded cost function,
under which the SequentialMechanism provides an Hn-approximation.
Proof. Consider a set N = {p1,p2, ...,pn} of players and the following function c : 2n→R≥0:
c(S)=


0 if S =;
k
j
if S = {p j }
min{k ,
∑
p j∈S c({p j })} if |S| ≥ 2
(21)
where k ≥ 0 and S ⊆ N . We have to show that the above function is subadditive, non-decreasing, it
has bounded average costs, and that the SequentialMechanism is Hn-approximate.
Subadditivity: Initially notice that if p1 ∈ S ⊆ N , then c(S) = k . Now consider the non-empty sets
A,B ⊆N .
• If p1 ∈ A∪B , then p1 is in at least one of A,B . Thus we have that c(A∪B )≤ c(A)+c(B ).
• If p1 ∉ A∪B , then
c(A∪B )=min{k ,
∑
p j∈A∪B
c({p j })}
≤min{k ,
∑
p j∈A
c({p j })+
∑
p j ∈B
c({p j })}
≤min{k ,
∑
p j∈A
c({p j })}+min{k ,
∑
p j∈B
c({p j })}
= c(A)+c(B )
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Non-decreasingness: Consider the sets A ⊆B ⊆N .
• If p1 ∈ A⇒ p1 ∈B⇒ c(A)= k = c(B ).
• If p1 ∉ A and p1 ∈B , thenC (A)=min{k ,
∑
p j∈A c({p j })}≤ k = c(B ).
• If p1 ∉ A and p1 ∉B , then c(A)=min{k ,
∑
p j∈A c({p j })}≤min{k ,
∑
p j ∈B c({p j })}= c(B ).
Min-bounded average costs: Consider the non-empty set of indices A ⊆ [n] and the set B =
{p1,p2, ...,p|A|}.
• If p1 ∈ A⇒ c(A)= k . Now notice that c(A)|A| = k|A| =min j∈B c({i j })≥min j∈A c({i j }).
• If p1 ∉ A, then we have that either c(A) = k and thus c(A)|A| ≥min j∈A c({i j }) as before, or c(A) =∑
p j ∈A c({p j }) and thus,
c(A)
|A| =
∑
p j ∈A c({p j })
|A| ≥min j∈A c({i j }).
Approximation of the Sequential Mechanism: Consider an instance where the value each player p j
has for the item is vp j = kj −ǫ, for arbitrary small ǫ> 0. Suppose now that A∗ is the optimal allocation,
A′ is the allocation where every player is served, and A is the output of the Sequential Mechanism, in
which it is easy to see that no player is served. We have that π(A∗)≤π(A′)= k , while
π(A)= 0+
∑
p j ∈N
k
j
−nǫ= kHn−nǫ.
So since ǫ is arbitrary small, the approximation cannot be better than Hn .
4.2 Improved Approximation Guarantees and Applications
We continue with a natural refinement of Definition 4.2 which turns out to provide even better ap-
proximation factors of the Sequential Mechanism.
Definition 4.7. A cost function c : 2N →R≥0 is α-averagemax-bounded, if there exists someα≥ 1 such
that for every set T ⊆N, we have α · c(T )|T | ≥ cmax, where cmax =max j∈T c({ j }).
Clearly, any function that is α-average max-bounded is also α-average min-bounded. Thus, we
already have an αHn-approximation for non-decreasing, subadditive and α-average max-bounded
cost functions. Below we show that we can achieve a much better guarantee.
Theorem 4.8. Suppose we have general valuation functions and for each item j ∈M, the cost function
c j : 2
N → R≥0 is non-decreasing, subadditive, and α-average max-bounded for some α ≥ 1. Then the
SequentialMechanism satisfies IR, NPT, WGSP, and is budget-balanced and α-approximate.
Proof. We only need to prove that the mechanism is α-approximate. By following exactly the same
reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.3 and using the observation made in Remark 4.5 (note that
c j is subadditive by assumption), we only need to prove that (20) holds for β = α. Exploiting the
properties of the cost functions, we obtain
∑
i∈N
∆i (A<i ,A∗i )≤
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈A∗
i
c j ({i })≤
∑
j∈M
∑
i∈T ∗
j
α
c j (T
∗
j
)
|T ∗
j
| =α
∑
j∈M
c j (T
∗
j )≤αC (A∗).
Example applications of combinatorial cost functions. We give some examples of combinatorial
cost functions below and show that they are α-average max-bounded (possibly depending on some
parameters of the combinatorial problem). In particular, by applying Theorem 4.8 we obtain attrac-
tive social cost approximation guarantees for these problems. For simplicity, all examples consider a
single item only; but clearly, we can consider more general multiple item settings (e.g., when for each
item j ∈M , c j captures one of the problems below).
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1. Set Cover. We are given a universe of elements U and a family F ⊆ 2U of subsets of U . The
players correspond to the elements ofU and the cost c(S) for serving a set of players S ⊆U is
defined as the size of a minimum cardinality set cover for S.
2. Vertex Cover. This is a special case of Set Cover. We are given an undirected and unweighted
graphG = (V ,E ) and the players are the edges of the graph. The cost c(S) for serving a set S ⊆ E
of players is defined as the size of a minimum vertex cover in the subgraph induced by S.
3. Matching. We are given an undirected and unweighted graph G = (V ,E ) and the players cor-
respond to the edges. The cost c(S) for serving a set S of players is defined as the size of a
maximum cardinality matching in the subgraph induced by S.
Using our α-average max-bounded notion, it is now easy to prove that these problems admit
constant social cost approximation guarantees (under certain restrictions).
Theorem 4.9. The SequentialMechanism is α-approximate for the above problems, where
1. α= d for the Set Cover problem, where d is the maximum cardinality of the sets in F ;
2. α= k for the Vertex Cover problem in graphs of maximum degree k;
3. α= k for the Matching problem in bipartite graphs of maximum degree k;
4. α= (5k +3)/4 for the Matching problem in general graphs of maximum degree k.
Proof. We have the following:
1. For Set Cover, it is trivial to check that the cost function is subadditive. Consider a subset T of
the players. Note that for a single player i ∈ T , c({i })= 1, since each element can be covered by
a single subset. Given that themaximum cardinality of a subset is d , theminimum set cover for
covering the set of players T is at least |T |/d . We conclude that c is d-averagemax-bounded.
2. Vertex Cover is a special case of Set Cover. Consider a subset T ⊆ E of the edges. Given that the
maximum degree is k , the minimum vertex cover for covering a set of edges T is at least |T |/k .
We conclude that this cost function is k-averagemax-bounded.
3. The cost function in the Maximum Matching problem is also subadditive. In bipartite graphs,
we also know that the cardinality of amaximummatching equals the cardinality of aminimum
vertex cover. This immediately implies a k-approximation.
4. For general graphs, note again that c({i }) = 1 for a single player i ∈ E . By the work of [14], we
know that in a graph ofm edges andwith degree k , there always exists amatching of size at least
4m/(5k +3). Hence for a set of players T ⊆ E , we have that c(T )/|T | ≥ 4/(5k +3). We conclude
that the cost function c is (5k +3)/4-average max-bounded.
We compare these bounds with the existing results in the literature: For Vertex Cover, there is a
mechanism that is 2-budget-balanced and O(logn)-approximate [16]. Thus, for graphs with maxi-
mum degree less than logn, we obtain a better guarantee. For Set Cover, there is a mechanisms that
isO(logn)-budget-balanced andO(logn)-approximate [16]. Hence, we obtain an improvement if the
sets in F have small size. Finally, we note that our results do not apply to the weighted versions of
these problems.
4.3 Guarantees of the SequentialMechanism for Non-Separable Cost Functions
We extend our results to non-separable cost functions. Recall that in this setting, the cost C (A) of an
allocation A = (Ai )i∈N is given by some general (not necessarily separable) cost function C : (2M )n →
R≥0. In particular,C may encode dependencies among different items.
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We introduce some more notation. Given two allocations S = (Si )i∈N and T = (Ti )i∈N , we define
S ∪T as the componentwise union of S and T , i.e., S ∪T = (S1∪T1, . . . ,Sn ∪Tn). Similarly, we write
S ⊆ T if this relation holds componentwise, i.e., Si ⊆ Ti for every i ∈ N . Given an allocation A =
(Ai )i∈N and a set of players S ⊆ N , we define A|S = (AS ,;−S) as the allocation in which each player
i ∈ S receives the items in Ai and all other players receive nothing. If S = {i } is a singleton set, we
also write A|i instead of A|{i }. Throughout this section, we remain in the domain of non-decreasing
and subadditive cost functions. In the non-separable case, a cost function C : (2M )n → R≥0 is non-
decreasing if C (S) ≤ C (T ) for every pair of allocations S,T , with S ⊆ T . Also, it is subadditive if for
every two allocations S = (Si )i∈N and T = (Ti )i∈N , we haveC (S∪T )≤C (S)+C (T ).
We now adapt Definitions 4.2 and 4.7 to non-separable cost functions.
Definition 4.10. Let C : (2M )n →R≥0 be a non-separable cost function.
• C isα-averagemin-bounded, if there exists someα≥ 1 such that for every allocation A and every
subset T ⊆N with |T | ≥ 2, it holds αC (A|T )|T | ≥Cmin, where Cmin =min j∈T C (A| j ).
• C isα-averagemax-bounded, if there exists someα≥ 1 such that for every allocation A and every
subset T ⊆N with |T | ≥ 2, it holds αC (A|T )|T | ≥Cmax, where Cmax =max j∈T C (A| j ).
As before, if a non-separable function is α-average max-bounded, then it is also α-average min-
bounded.
We remark that it has been shown in [17, 8] that the Sequential Mechanism is weakly group-
strategyproof and budget balanced for the non-separable setting. We proceed by adapting Propo-
sition 4.4 for the non-separable setting.
Proposition 4.11. If C : (2M )n → R≥0 is a non-separable cost function, which is non-decreasing and
α-average min-bounded, then for every allocation A,
∑
i∈T C (A|i )≤H|T | ·C (A|T ) for every T ⊆N.
Proof. Let A be an allocation and fix T ⊆ N . Rename the players in T such that for any i , j ∈ T with
i < j , it holds thatC (A|i )≥C (A| j ). For convenience, we may assume that T = {1,2, . . . , |T |}. Fix some
i ∈ T and consider the set {1,2, . . . , i } = [i ] ⊆ T . By exploiting that C is α-average min-bounded and
non-decreasing, we have
C (A|i )≤α
C (A|[i ])
i
≤ C (A|T )
i
.
Note that the above inequality holds for any i ∈ T . Summing over all players i ∈ T proves the
claim.
Now using the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 4.3, we obtain the same approximation
guarantee of αHn as in the separable setting. Further, the improvement we obtained in Theorem 4.8
also goes through in this setting. We summarize these observations in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.12. Suppose we have general valuation functions and a non-decreasing, subadditive, and
α-average min-bounded cost function C : (2M )n → R≥0. Then the Sequential Mechanism satisfies IR,
NPT, WGSP, and is budget balanced and α ·Hn-approximate. Furthermore, if C is also α-average max-
bounded, then the Sequential Mechanism isα-approximate.
5 Discussion
In Section 3, we proposed themechanism IACSM, which is weakly group-strategyproof under general
cost functions and symmetric submodular valuations. Moreover it is α-budget balanced and 2α3Hn-
approximate when we restrict the cost functions to the α-average-decreasing class. The social cost
approximation guarantee further improves to Hn if the cost functions are symmetric submodular
and this is best possible (due to the known lower bound for public-excludable goods [7]). It would be
very interesting to explore mechanisms that go beyond symmetric submodular valuation functions.
It seems that entirely new ideas are needed for this setting. It would also be interesting to extend
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our mechanism to non-separable cost functions. We note that separability of the costs in Section 3
is needed for IACSM only to argue that the cost share per item increases as players withdraw (with
respect to the trace). One would need to investigate how to adapt the mechanism and enforce this
property in the non-separable setting. Technically, this seems far from obvious and we leave a proper
treatment of this issue for future work.
In Section 4, we studied the (partially) complementary class of α-average min bounded cost
functions. We showed that the well-known Sequential Mechanism is budget balanced and αHn-
approximate even for general valuation functions. These results also extend to non-separable cost
functions. A very natural question is whether SM is optimal in this setting and we note that the an-
swer is not yet clear: The impossibility result of [7] holds for the public-excludable good cost function
which is symmetric submodular and thus 1-average-decreasing. However, it is not hard to see that
this does not fall within the α-average min bounded class for any constant α. This leads to the ques-
tion of whether there exists a WGSPmechanism that breaks theΩ(log(n))-approximation in terms of
social cost for α-average-min bounded functions with small values of α.
Finally, what we also find very interesting is to identify the class of cost functions for which nei-
ther of the two mechanisms studied here perform well. Recall that, for any constant value of α, if a
cost function is either α-average decreasing or α-average min-bounded, then a good performance is
guaranteed. Thus, we need look at the complement of the set of α-average decreasing functions and
the set of α-average min-bounded functions for small value of α and examine whether these com-
plements have a non-empty intersection. The following proposition shows that this intersection is
indeed non-empty.
Proposition 5.1. Given α ≥ 1, the intersection of the complements of α-average-decreasing and α-
average min-bounded functions is non-empty.
Proof. We begin by defining the complements of the two sets:
• Complement of α-average-decreasing: For every constant α≥ 1 that we choose, there exist sets
S ⊆ T ⊆N such that: αC (S)|S| <
C (T )
|T | .
• Complement of α-average min-bounded: For every constant α ≥ 1 that we choose, there exists
a set T ⊆N such that: αC (T )|T | <C ({i }), where i = argmin j∈T C ({ j }).
Wewill prove this for the case where there exists only a single item. Consider setN = {p1,p2, ...,pn }
of players and the following function c : 2n→R≥0:
c(S)=


0 if S =;√
j if S = {p j }
max j∈S c({p j }) if |S| ≥ 2
(22)
where S ⊆ N . Before we proceed with the proof, notice that this function is also subadditive and by
definition non-decreasing.
• Complement of α-average-decreasing: Set S = {p2} and T = {p2,pn}. Now notice that α<
p
n
2 ⇒
2α<pn, which holds since for any α≥ 1 that we choose, we can always find a large enough n
for the inequality to be true.
• Complement of α-average min-bounded: S = {p2} and T =N . Now notice that α
p
n
n
< 1⇒pn <
n
α
, which holds since for any α≥ 1 that we choose, we can always find a large enough n for the
inequality to be true.
Therefore, the intersection of the complements is non-empty and the proof is complete.
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Notice that the proof of this proposition follows by constructing a cost function that requires non-
constant values of α to be captured by either of our parameterizations. Although the intersection
turns out to be non-empty, the constructed cost function is rather artificial and more natural exam-
ples are elusive so far. In fact, for most of the known cost functions that have been studied in the lit-
erature, at least one of ourmechanisms achieves anO(Hn)-approximation. Tomake further progress,
we believe it is important to understand better the class of functions defined by the intersection of
the two complements, as it would help us to identify the missing elements for deriving mechanisms
for a wider class of cost functions.
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